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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NEIL TROTTA, 
Plaintiff/ Appellant, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOY-
MENT SECURITY, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Case No. 18237 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal pursuant to Section 35-4-lO(i), Utah Code Annotated 
1953, from a decision by the Board of Review, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
reversing a decision by an Appeals Referee that allowed unemployment compen-
sation to the Plaintiff/Appellant pursuant to Section 35-4-5(b)(l), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended (Pocket Supplement, 1979), on the grounds he had 
been discharged from his last employment for actions connected with his work 
which were not disq~alifying. 
1 
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DISPOSITION BELOW 
Plaintiff Neil Trotta's October 30, 1981 claim for unemployment bene-
fits was allowed effective November 1, 1981, by a Department Representative 
who found he was discharged for an act or omission in connection with his 
employment.which was not disqualifying pursuant to Section 35-4-S(b)(l), Utah 
Code Annotated 1953, as amended (Pocket Supplement, 1979). Timely appeal was 
made by the employer to the Appeals Referee of the Department of Employment 
Security on November 17, 1981. On December 10, 19~1, a hearing was conducted 
and subsequently, the Referee affirmed the allowance of benefits by the De-
partment Representative. On December 16, 1981, timely appeal was made by the 
employer to the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, which 
in turn reversed the decision of the Referee allowing benefits to the Plain-
tiff in a decision dated February 4, 1982, Case No. 81-A-4474 and 81-BR-431. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Plaintiff by this appeal is seeking reversal of the decision of 
the Board of Review and allowance of benefits commencing November 1, 1981. 
Defendant seeks affinnance of the decision of the Board of Review which 
denied benefits to the Plaintiff. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant substantially agrees with the statement of facts set forth in 
Plaintiff's Brief. 
2 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT IN REVIEWING DETERMINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL AFFIRM 
THE FINDING OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW IF SUCH ARE SUSTAINED BY 
SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
The standard of review in unemployment insurance cases is well estab-
1 i shed. Section 35-4-lO(i), Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides in part: 
In any judicial proceedings under this section the find-
ings of the Commission and the Board of Review as to the 
facts if supported by evidence shall be conclusive and 
the jurisdiction of said Court shall be confined to ques-
tions of 1 aw. 
This Court has consistently held that where the findings of the Commis-
sion and the Board of Review are supported by evidence, they will not be 
disturbed. Martinez v. Board of Review, 25 U. 2d 131, 477 P. 2d 587 (1970). 
In analyzing the above-referenced review provision, this Court has stated: 
Under Section 35-4-lO(i) the role of this Court is to 
sustain the determination of the Board of Review unless 
the record clearly and persuasively proves the action of 
the Board of Review was arbitrary, capricious, and un-
reasonable. Specifically, as a matter of law, the deter-
mination was wrong; because only the opposite conclusion 
could be drawn from the facts. Continental Oil Company 
v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, (Utah, 1977) 568 P. 2d 727, 729. 
POINT II 
THE FINDINGS OF THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS-
SION ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
Plaintiff contends the facts as found by the Board of Review are not 
supported by the evidence. This Court has previously held that where the 
3 
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evidence will sustain different findings, the Court will affinn the findings 
of the Board of Review. Continental Oil Company v. Board of Review, Supra. 
Ther~ is substantial evidence in the record of this case to sustain the 
decision of the Board of Review. Defendant acknowledges this is a very close 
case as reflected by the 2-1 Board decision to reverse the Appeal Referee's 
allowance of benefits. Nevertheless, the case is close because much of the 
employer's evidence· is hearsay, which, unfortunately is quite o.ften the case 
in the commission's administrative hearings where the employer has little or 
no direct pecuniary interest in the outcome; is usually represented by lay 
persons unfamiliar with rules of evidence who have interviewed the parties 
having direct knowledge of the matters, but who themselves have no such 
direct knowledge. 
The easy answer in such cases would be to exclude the employer's hearsay 
evidence. This, however, would be an abdication of Defendant's responsibil-
ity to administer the unemployment insurance trust funds to pay benefits to 
all who are unemployed through no fault of their own, but to deny benefits 
to those who are responsi b 1 e for their own unemployment.. 01 of Nelson Con-
struction Company' v. Industrial Commission, 121 .U. 525, 243 P. 2d 951; Kenne-
cott Copper Corporation Employees v. Department of Employment Security, 13 U. 
2d 262, 372 P. 2d 987. 
Furthermore, hearsay evidence is admissable in administrative hearings 
but must be carefully evaluated to determine its probative value. Board of 
Review v. Theresa J. Cija, Pennsylvania Supreme Court, 1981, CCH Unemployment 
Insurance Reports, Pa. •10,723. 
4 
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In analyzing the evidence given regarding Plaintiff's absences on Octo-
ber 19, 20, 27 and 28, 1981, it is noted that the only questions that are not 
conclusively answered are: 1) whether Plaintiff went deer hunting on more 
than one of the four days he was absent from work; 2) whether Plaintiff or 
his wife actually called the employer to report he would not be in; and 3) 
if they did call in, whether they merely said he wouldn't be in or whether 
they reported he was ill. 
There is no question that: 
1. Plaintiff went deer hunting on at least one regular 
work day; (R.0026-0028). 
2. Plaintiff failed to request any of the days off from 
his employer in that according to his own testimony 
he or his wife merely called the shop and told whom-
ever answered (they couldn't identify with whom they 
spoke) that Plaintiff would not be in. (R.0025, 
0030-0031) 
3. Plaintiff made no effort to inform the employer of 
the reason he wouldn't be to work. (R.0023-0025, 
0027, 0030-0031) 
4. Plaintiff knew he was needed at work. (R.0029, 0031) 
5. The employer has substantial reason to believe Plain-
tiff was absent because he was deer hunting on at 
least one day when he should have been to work or at 
least have requested the day off. (R.0023, 0032) 
5 
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6. The employer terminated Plaintiff not only because 
he believed Plaintiff was deliberately avoiding his 
responsibilities to the employer to either be to 
work or request the days off, but because he felt 
Defendant was not being trustworthy regarding his 
absences. {R.0023-25, 0031, 0032) 
Under Part A of Point I of his Brief, Plaintiff argues that going deer 
hunting while sick with the flu is not misconduct. Such a generalized state-
ment is incorrect on its face; however, neither the employer's decision to 
discharge the Plaintiff, nor the Board's denial of benefits were based on 
this premise. As stated below, the reason claimant was terminated by the 
employer and denied unemployment benefits by the Board of Review is that he 
failed to notify the employer of the reasons for his absence and attempted to 
conceal those reasons from his employer. He thus lost his credibility with 
his employer (R.0032) and failed to establish credibility with the Board of 
Review (R.0007 and 0008) or even the Appeal Referee, who had allowed benefits 
{R.0018). 
Under Part B of Point I of his Brief, Plaintiff argues he did not break 
any company policies regarding absences from work. Pl ai nti ff cites as sup-
port for this argument a sentence from the testimony of t.he employer's repre-
sentative, Mrs. Fisher, at R.0023, that any employee could have time off for 
any reason even if it was inconvenient for the employer. Plaintiff failed 
to take notice, however, of Mrs. Fisher's next sentence which gives the 
employer's policy regarding absenteeism. Both sentences are as follows: 
I'd like to also state with this information that we like 
to feel that we are reasonable with our employees and 
6 
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anyone who comes to us asking for additional time off 
for almost any reason, generally gets it even if it's'in-
convenient to us. But we feel that our employees need to 
be honest with us and considerate of our needs as employ-
ers also, and people who don't tell us what they really 
need, we don't feel like we can trust them. (R.0023) (Emphasis added.) 
Mrs. Fisher explained the application of this policy to Plaintiff at 
R.0032: 
But when the deer hunting problem came up and he couldn't 
even call us up to say, "Look, I want to go deer hunting 
another day. I won't be in, 11 we felt 1 i ke at that point 
he didn't trust us enough and we couldn't trust him 
enough to keep him around. The date of deer hunting, 
even if it was, as he said, the 27th, it would be the 
same position. The 27th was a day he should have been at 
work. ( R .0032) 
Thus it is clear that Plaintiff was not fired for going deer hunting 
while ill, or not failing to work overtime, or for poor job perfonnance, or 
for fai 1 i ng to notify his employer of his absences, al though these factors 
may have been part of the overall consideration. Therefore, Plaintiff's 
argument under Parts A, C, D and E beg the question in that they are not 
responsive to the primary reason given by the employer for tenni nati ng 
Plaintiff (R .0023, 0032) nor to the reasoning of Defendant in denying Plain-
ti ff unemployment insurance benefits. (R.0007) 
Under Part E of Point I of his Brief, Plaintiff argues that Plaintiff 
or his wife called the employer each day Plaintiff was absent. However, even 
Plaintiff noted that the requirement was not just that the employee call in, 
but that he was to 11 advise them of the reason for the absence ( R .24) 11 (Page 
13 of Plaintiff's Brief.) 
7 
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Even if Plaintiff or his wife did call the employer each day Pl ai nti ff 
was absent, it is c 1 ear that neither advised the emp 1 oye r of the reason for 
the absence. (R.0023-0025, 0027, 0030-0031) 
Plaintiff was also evasive when answering the Appeal Referee's questions 
about explaining the reason for his absence as shown by the following dia-
1 ague: 
Referee: What was your intention as far as calling in 
that day or having your wife call in that day, 
Mr. Trotta? 
Neil What do you mean my intention? 
Trotta: 
Referee: Well, were you accustomed to giving the employ-
er prior notice when you were going to go hunt-
ing or take time off work? 
Neil Yeh, I didn't have--see, like, uh, you know, I 
Trotta: took the one day off and they knew about it~­
Fri day, the 16th. But as far as I never, you 
know, received any type of written regulations, 
·employee or whatever, but if you go to the 
appeal again, I didn't know where it says--
that he, he never called in sick, which was 
untrue there, because I did call in on Octo-
ber 19. I definitely called. Let's see •. That 
says: " ••• in spite of company pol icy of 
which all our employees are aware that all 
absences must be excused ahead of time ••• " 
Now, when I was sick, I don't see how I could 
have known I was going to be sick in advance. 
I tell you, that sounds a little bit ridicu-
1 ous. ( R.0027) 
Defendant submits that Plaintiff's response to the Appeal Referee's 
question is indicative of a guilty conscience. Plaintiff knew he had misled 
his employer about his absence; that he had not been forthright as was 
Mr. Gardner who called the employer to ask for the day off to go deer hunting 
8 
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with Plaintiff. (R.0023) In this regard it is noted that Mr. Gardner rec-
ognized his obligation to request time off from the employer, even though 
he was a part-time employee who came in a few hours after high school twice 
a week. (R.0028 & 0032) Obviously Plaintiff also recognized that obligation 
and deliberately violated it. 
It should al so be noted that the Appeal Referee pointed out "several 
inconsistencies in infonnation presented by the claimant" (R.0018), and the 
Board of Review found his statement of reason for quit or discharge (R.0039) 
to be mi sl eadi ng and his testimony that he was i 11 on October 27 to 1 ack 
credibility (R.0007-0008). 
An example of Pl ai nti ff' s inconsistency is found in his response to his 
employer's appeal to the Board of Review, where he states: 
He contends I went deer hunting on Oct. 19, 20, 27, and 
the 28. Why would I have done that when I got a deer on 
opening day Oct. 17th and on the 19th and 20th 1 was 
sick. He also states I went hunting on Oct. 28th which 
would be extremely illegal for the season closed on 
Oct. 27th, that is the day I went with Jack Gardner who, 
for a reason unknown to me signed a statement saying he 
went hunting with me on Oct. 20. That could be easily 
proven by a simple attendance check on Jack Gardner who 
attends Cypress High School. I'm sure you wil 1 find 
he was in attendance on Oct. 20th and was absent on 
Oct. 27th. Jack is a senior at Cypress High School. 
(R.0011) (Emphasis added.) 
In this one paragraph Plaintiff argues he would not have gone deer hunt-
; ng on October 19, 20, 27 and 28 because he got his deer on opening day, 
October 17, and that hunting on October 28 would have been i 11 egal because 
the season closed October 27. He then admits he did go deer hunting on Octo-
ber 27. If he got his deer on October 17, why did he fee 1 he needed to go 
hunting on October 27? It is inconsistent to argue he wouldn't have gone 
hunting on October 20 because he got his deer on October 17 and then admit 
9 
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·he went hunting on October 27. This further demons~rates his disregard for 
his employer's interest when he chooses to go deer hunting after he got his 
deer rather than report to work. The Pl ai nti ff 1 s testimony as to the dates 
he actually went hunting is contradicted by the employer's testimony that a 
co-worker called the night before and asked for October 20 off to go deer 
hunting with Plaintiff. (R.0023, 0037) 
In this case it is cl ear from the record that the empl ayer had a small, 
informal business in which the rules regarding absenteeism were very liberal. 
The only rule was that the employee notify the employer as soon as possible 
that he was to be absent and give the reasons for the absence. 
Plaintiff deliberately vi al ated this rule in that he or his wife merely 
called in to say· Plaintiff would be absent that day without stating the 
reason. No effort was made to talk to the employer or Plaintiff's supervisor 
to make sure the proper persons were aware that he would be absent. Although 
there may appear to be some dispute as to dates and whether Plaintiff or his 
wife even called in, and what they said if they did ca 11 in, a more candid 
employee specifically requested time off to gG deer hunting with Plaintiff, 
while Plaintiff clearly withheld the reasons for his absence from his employ-
er, as already noted. 
POINT Ill 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW DID NOT ERR IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PLAIN-
TIFF WAS DISCHARGED FOR DELIBERATE, WILLFUL ACTION ADVERSE TO 
HIS EMPLOYER'S RIGHTFUL INTERESTS. 
Plaintiff cites a number of cases throughout his Brief suggesting that 
the decision of the Board of Review ; s wrong as a matter of law. To the 
10 
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extent Pl ai nti ff has attempted to rel ate those cases to the facts of the 
instant matter, the cases are clearly distinguishable. Defendant acknowl-
edges that a spontaneous decision not intended to injure the employer's 
interests is not misconduct, Eagan v. Philips, 431 N.Y.S. 2d 731, 784 o. 
2d 564 (App. Div. 1980); nor is a single act of carelessness misconduct, 
or mi nor i ndi screti ons for which the employer has no stated policy, as in 
Coulter v. Commonwealth Unemployment Board of Review, 332 A. 2d 876 (Pa. 
1975); nor is failure to call a specific office as required by notice when 
calls to other areas had been accepted previously by the employer, as in 
Penn Photomats Incorporated v. Commonwealth Compensation Board of Review, 
417 A. 2d 1311 (Pa. 1980). However, the claimant in the instant case was 
not di squa 1 ifi ed for any of the foregoing reasons, as has been deta i 1 ed in 
Point 11 hereof. 
In the case of Continental Oil Company v. Board of Review of the Indus-
trial Commission of Utah, Supra at 730, this Court has defined misconduct 
as: 
• • • the intended meaning of the term "misconduct" 
••• is limited to conduct evincing such willful or 
wanton disregard of employer's interests as is found 
in deliberate violations or disregard of standards of 
behavior which the employer has the right to expect of 
his employee or in carelessness or negligence of such 
degree or recurrence as to manifest equal culpability, 
wrongful intent or evil design, or to show an inten-
tional and substantial disregard of the employer's 
interest or of the employee's duties and obligations 
to his employer. On the other hand mere inefficiency, 
unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good performance as 
a result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or 
ordinary negligence in isolated instances, or good faith 
errors in judgment or discretion are not to be ~eemed 
"misconduct" within the meaning of the statute. 
11 
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See also Januzik v. Department of Employment Security and Board of Review of 
the Industrial Commission Utah, 569 P. 2d 1112 (Utah 1977). 
The facts as found by the Board of Review cl early require the conclu-
sion that the claimant's conduct constituted a "deliberate disregard of stan-
dards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of his employee." 
Pl ai nti ff further contends that the employer had a burden to reprimand 
or warn the Plaintiff about his conduct. While warnings put an employee on 
notice that his job is in jeopardy, thus supporting a finding of fault on the 
part of an employee who continues in conduct of which he has been so warned, 
the essential element in misconduct as well as voluntary leaving cases is 
whether the claimant is at fault in his resulting unemployment. Olof Nelson 
Construction Company v. Industrial Commission, Supra; Mills v. Gronning, 
581 P. 2d 1334 (Utah 1978). In the instant matter, the Board of Review 
found the Plaintiff knew that taking the day off to go deer hunting would 
cause his employer additional expense and that the Plaintiff further attempt-
ed to conceal from his employer the real reason for his absence. Under such 
circumstances a denial of benefits is proper. 76 Am. Jur. 2d, .Unemployment 
Compensation, Section 58, Page 954. The findings in the instant matter 
being supported by substantial competent evidence, the majority decision 
of the Board of Review properly concluded that the Pl ai nti ff recognized his 
actions would be adverse to the rightful interests of the employer. Under 
such circumstances the decision of the Board of Review denying benefits to 
the Plaintiff was correct as a matter of law. 
12 
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CONCLUSION 
The evidence in support of the decision of the Board of Review is both 
competent and substantial. The Board of Review is not bound by the findings 
of the Appeal Referee even when such findings are supported by evidence. The 
decision should, therefore, be affinned. 
Respectfully submitted this day of June, 1982. 
--
DAVID L. WILKINSON, 
Attorney General of Utah 
FLOYD G. AST! N 
K. ALLAN ZABEL 
Special Assistants 
Attorney General 
By 
----k~.---A~ll~a-n--za~b-e~l~~~~--~ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that I mai 1 ed two copies of the foregoing Defen-
dant's Brief, postage prepaid, to the following this __ day of June, 1982: 
John L. Black, Jr., Utah Legal Services, Inc., 637 East Fourth South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84102. 
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